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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. : 
BRIAN DALE LARSEN, : Case No. 20080519-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. ; 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This is an appeal from a Restitution Order following a judgment of conviction for 
one count of Joyriding with Intent to Temporarily Deprive the Owner Thereof, a class A 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1314 (2005); and one count of 
Unlawful Possession of Burglary Tools, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-205 (2003), in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable William W. Barrett presiding. Jurisdiction is 
conferred upon this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(c) (effective 
February 7, 2008). Sec Addendum A (Sentence, Judgment, Commitment). 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue: Whether the trial court erred by ordering Larsen to pay restitution for the 
damage done to the vehicle during the initial theft when Larsen was not charged with or 
convicted of theft, did not admit responsibility for the vehicle damage, and did not agree 
to pay restitution for the vehicle damage as part of his guilty plea. Alternatively, whether 
the trial court erred by ordering Larsen to pay restitution in excess of the $500 ceiling set 
by Larsen"s guilty plea to Joyriding, a class A misdemeanor. 
Standard of Review: u'\ Appellate courts] will not disturb a trial court's order of 
restitution unless the trial court exceeds the authority prescribed by law or abuses its 
discretion." Furthermore, c[w|hethcr a restitution (award) is proper . . . depends solely 
upon interpretation of the governing statute, and the trial court's interpretation of a statute 
presents a question of law, which [this Court) review) s| for correctness/" State v. Miller, 
2007 UT App 332, €,|6, 170 P.3d 1141 (internal citations omitted). 
Preservation: This issue is preserved at R. 89-92 (Objection to State's Motion for 
Restitution and Request for Hearing); and R. 122 (Restitution Hearing). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following are determinative of the issue on appeal. Their text is provided in 
full at Addendum B. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1314 (2005) - Joyriding; 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (Supp. 2008) Sentencing Definitions; 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-205 (2003) - Unlawful Possession of Burglary Tools; 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (Supp. 2007) Theft by Receiving Stolen Property; 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-102 (Supp. 2008) Restitution Definitions; 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-202 (2003) Prosecution Duties for Restitution; 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302 (Supp. 2008) - Restitution Criteria. 
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STATEMENT OF CASE 
Larscn was charged by information with one count each of Theft by Receiving 
Stolen Property, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 
(Supp. 2007); Unlawful Possession of Burglary Tools, a class B misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-205 (2003); and Failure to Stop for a Red Light, a 
class C misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-305 (2005). R. 1-3. 
On July 16, 2007, Larscn pleaded guilty to one count of Joyriding with Intent to 
Temporarily Deprive the Owner Thereof, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 41-la-1314 (2005); and one count of Unlawful Possession of Burglary 
'Fools, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-205 (2003). R. 25-
26; 27-33; 130:2, 5-6; s^e Addenda C and D. In exchange, the State agreed to dismiss 
Count III. R. 26; 30; 130:2. The trial court ordered a presentence report (PSR). R. 25; 
130:5-6. 
The trial court held a sentencing hearing on February 4, 2008. R. 77-78: 130:8; 
see Addendum K. It sentenced Larscn to serve 365 days in jail for the class A 
misdemeanor and 180 days in jail for the class B misdemeanor. R. 77; 130:10. It ran the 
jail terms concurrently, but consecutively with case no. 071905122 (case no. 5122). R. 
77; 130:10-11. It then suspended the jail terms and placed Larscn on probation for 36 
months. R. 77; 130:10. The trial court also left "the restitution on this case open for 45 
days." R. 77; 130:10. 
On March 14, 2008, the State filed a Motion for Restitution, asking for "restitution 
in the amount of $4,754.50 to be paid to the viclim(s).'* R. 79. The trial court granted the 
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State's motion. R. 81. Thereafter, Larscn objeeted to the State's motion and requested a 
hearing. R. 89-92. The trial court set aside its restitution order and scheduled a 
restitution hearing. R. 102-03; 106. 
On May 15, 2008, the trial court held a restitution hearing. R. 109; 122; see 
Addendum 1\ Following argument, the trial court ordered restitution in the amount of 
$3,554.50. R. 122:6-7. On June 10, 2008, Larsen filed a timely notice of appeal from the 
trial court's restitution order. R. 112. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS1 
On April 30, 2007, THG Auto Brokers reported that a 1998 Jeep Grand Cherokee 
was stolen from its car lot. R. 2. On May 6? 2007, an officer initiated a traffic stop after 
he observed Larsen drive through a red light. R. 72:3. Larscn was driving the stolen 
vehicle. R. 72:3. When the officer asked Larsen about the vehicle, Larscn said it 
"belonged to his friend and he had borrowed it that night.'' R. 72:3. lie also denied 
knowing that "the vehicle was stolen." R. 72:3. In a subsequent search of the vehicle, 
officers discovered "the ignition switch had been removed." "the steering column was 
damaged." and "sound speakers . . . had been removed from their proper locations." R. 
72:3. They also "found screwdrivers, wrenches, a hammer, and a pry bar apparently used 
to dismantle parts of the vehicle." R. 72:3. 
In his guilty plea, Larsen admitted the following elements: "Unauthorized control 
over the motor vehicle of another with the intent to temporarily deprive. Possession of 
The facts are taken from the Information, the guilty pica affidavit, the change of plea 
hearing, the Victim Impact Statement, and the PSR. 
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tools under circumstances manifesting an intent to use in the commission of a theft." R. 
28. The factual basis was that "on May 6 l \ 2007 in Salt Lake County," he "exercised 
unlawful control over a vehicle belonging to TUG Auto Brokers with the intent to 
temporarily deprive. At that time he was in possession of tools that under the 
circumstances manifested intent to use to commit a theft." R. 28; 130:4. 
The PSR recommended that Larsen be placed on "formal probation to Adult 
Probation and Parole." R. 72:1. One of the "special conditions" of probation it 
recommended was that Larson "|p|ay restitution in the amount of $4,754.50." R. 72:1. 
Likewise, the State filed a Motion for Restitution, asking for "restitution in the amount of 
$4,754.50 to be paid to the victim(s)." R. 79. The proposed restitution sum came from 
the total damage reported by THG Auto Brokers. R. 83-88. TUG Auto Brokers itemized 
the damage as follows: 
Vehicle Damage: 
Impound/Towing 
Mechanical 
Repairs/Labor 
Parts (Hinckley Dodge) 
Detail 
$282.00 
$1,412.50 
$1,765.00 
$95~00 
TOTAL: $3,554.50 
Property Damage: 
Fence/Gate $1,200.00 
TOTAL: $1,200.00 
R. 72:6; 83; sec Addendum G. 
The trial court initially granted the State's motion. R. 81. But it later set aside its 
restitution order and scheduled a restitution hearing after Larsen objected to the 
restitution order and requested a hearing. R. 89-92: 102-03; 106. 
Tn his motion and at the restitution hearing, Larsen stipulated to $282.00 in 
restitution. R. 122:8. lie argued, however, that restitution in excess of that amount was 
inappropriate. R. 122:3-4. First, the damage to the vehicle was "clearly . . . caused by 
the break in" that occurred w\six or seven" days prior to Larsen being found in possession 
of the vehicle. R. 90; 122:3. Larsen, however, was not charged with or convicted of 
stealing the vehicle. R. 122:3. Rather, he was charged with Theft by Receiving and 
entered a guilty plea to Joyriding. R. 122:3. Thus, absent an "agreement as to 
restitution/* Larsen should only be ordered to pay restitution for "damage caused by the 
defendant once he received the vehicle." R. 122:3. Second, Larsen argued that 
restitution should not exceed $500. R. 122:3-4. Larsen pleaded guilty to Joyriding, a 
class A misdemeanor, which is defined as joyriding that results in less than $500 damage 
to the vehicle. R. 90; 122:3, Thus, because "there was no specific plea bargain regarding 
restitution." LarsciTs restitution should not exceed $500. R. 90; 122:3. Finally, Larsen 
argued that he should not be ordered to pay restitution for "damage to the gate and 
surrounding area where the vehicle was stolen from," especially where "this is the third 
time that there's been a break in there." R. 122:4. "That would be appropriate for a 
charge of burglary of a building or theft of a car from a building or criminal mischief. 
But again, there's no evidence that he [wasj anywhere near that building ever in his life." 
R. 122:4. 
In response, the State conceded that damage to the gate and fence was not 
6 
"appropriate [restitutionj for this defendant because . . . we don't have evidence that he is 
actually the one who stole the vehicle." R. 122:4. It argued, however, that the trial court 
"must assume that the damage that was done to the vehicle was done while the defendant 
was in possession of that vehicle." R. 122:5. "The only evidence is that he was the one 
in possession of this vehicle. And as such then I think he is responsible for any damage 
that was done to the vehicle from the time it was stolen until the time it was recovered." 
R. 122:5. It also cirgued that restitution could exceed $500 because "any time that there is 
a plea down on anything it's implicit that restitution is going to be part of that plea." R. 
122:5. Thus, the State asked for "the damages of $3,554.50." R. 122:6. That number 
includes "the towing, the repairs . . . and labor and parts and detail" for the vehicle, but it 
"does not include the damage to the fence." R. 122:6. 
Agreeing with the State, the trial court ordered restitution in the amount of 
$3,554.50. R. 122:6-7. This sum included the total damage to the vehicle, but excluded 
the damage to the fence and gate. R. 72:6; 83; 122:6, The trial court stated that it did not 
"care" that Larsen pleaded guilty to a class A misdemeanor, which contains provisions 
limiting the damage to $500 and the possession to 24 hours. It found that these 
provisions did not "prevent" it from ordering Larsen to pay restitution for the total 
damage done to the vehicle. R. 122:7-8. 
The trial court then considered restitution in case no. 5122, where Larsen pleaded 
guilty to Theft by Receiving Stolen Property, a third felony. R. 122:8-9; sec R. 72:5; 
74:1. In that case, the PSR stated that Larsen was stopped on June 25, 2007. R. 74:3. 
Similar to this case, he was driving a vehicle that was reported stolen on June 22, 2007. 
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Regarding case no. 5122, the trial court declined to order restitution because "based upon 
the charge that he admitted to[,| there's no evidence that he did any damage, that he was 
just operating the vehicle, he knew it was stolen when he was caught, I guess basically." 
R. 122:9. Larsen asked for clarification on the trial court's ruling: aI think the State has 
the same confusion I have, judge. How do we get restitution on the first case then?" R, 
122:9. The trial court responded, "Well, I think the joyridc there's no evidence that he 
didn't steal the car. It's not a theft by receiving. He admitted he was in possession of it." 
R. 122:9. When the trial court asked whether its reasoning was clear, the State said, 
"Well, you made it clear, I'm just not sure I agree with you on that reasoning. 1 just don't 
see that, 1 mean, 1 guess I don't see the difference." R. 122:9. In conclusion, the trial 
court said. "I feel more comfortable with the joyridc than I do by the theft by receiving so 
Til deny it. They can sue him civilly." R. 122:9. 
Thereafter, Larsen filed a timely notice of appeal from the trial court's restitution 
order. R. 112. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court should reverse the restitution order because the trial court erred by 
ordering Larsen to pay full restitution for the vehicle damage. A defendant cannot be 
ordered to pay restitution for criminal activities for which the defendant did not admit 
responsibility, was not convicted, or did not agree to pay restitution. In this case, Larson 
should not be held to answer for the vehicle damage because he pleaded guilty to 
joyriding, not the theft that caused the damage: the evidence did not firmly establish that 
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he admitted responsibility for the vehicle damage; and he did not agree to pay restitution 
for the vehicle damage as part of his plea agreement. Alternatively, Larsen should not be 
held to answer for more than $500 in restitution because, if he admitted responsibility for 
the vehicle damage at all, he did not admit responsibility for more that the $500 ceiling 
set by the statute he pleaded guilty to Joyriding, a class A misdemeanor. 
ARGUMENT 
THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE RESTITUTION ORDER 
BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ORDERING LARSEN TO 
PAY FULL RESTITUTION FOR THE VEHICLE DAMAGE 
This Court should reverse the trial court's order that Larsen pay $3,554.50 in 
restitution. The trial court's restitution order encompassed the total damages to the 
vehicle, including mechanical repairs, labor, parts, and detailing. These damages, 
however, were caused by the original theft of the vehicle. Because Larsen was not 
charged with or convicted of theft, the trial court erred by ordering Larsen to recoup these 
damages as part of his restitution. Instead, the trial court should have ordered Larsen to 
pay $282, the cost of impounding and towing the vehicle. See supra at Part A. 
Alternatively, Larsen pleaded guilty to Joyriding, a class A misdemeanor, and Unlawful 
Possession of Burglary Tools, a class B misdemeanor. Because Joyriding, a class A 
misdemeanor, is statutorily limited to $500 in damages, the trial court erred by ordering 
Larsen to pa) more than $500 in restitution. See supra at Part B. 
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A. The Trial Court Erred By Ordering Larscn to Pay Restitution For the 
Vehicle Damage Caused By the Theft Where Larsen Was Not Convicted of 
Theft, Did Not Admit Responsibility for the Damage, and Did Not Agree to 
Pay Restitution For the Damage In His Plea Agreement 
"At the time of entry of a conviction or entry of any plea disposition," the State 
must "'provide to the district court. . . whether or not the defendant has agreed to pay the 
restitution specified as part of the plea disposition." Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-202(l) 
(2003). '1 hereafter, if the defendant has been "convicted of criminal activity that has 
resulted in pecuniary damages," the trial court must "order that the defendant make 
restitution to the victims, or for the conduct for which the defendant has agreed to make 
restitution as part of a plea agreement." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (4)(a) (Supp. 2008); 
sec Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(l) (Supp. 2008) (same); State v. Snyder, 747 P.2d 417, 
420 (Utah 1987) (holding "upon conviction of a crime which has resulted in pecuniary 
damages . . . trial court is statutorily mandated to order the payment of restitution"). 
As defined by the Utah Code, a victim is a "person who the court determines has 
suffered pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant's criminal activities." Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-3-201(l)(c)(i); see Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(l) (Supp. 2008); Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-38a-102( 14)(a) (Supp. 2008). The defendant's criminal activities are limited 
to the "offense of which the defendant is convicted or any other criminal conduct for 
which the defendant admits responsibility to the sentencing court with or without an 
admission of committing the criminal conduct." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(1 )(b); see 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-102(2) (Supp. 2008) (same); Utah Code Ann. § 77-3 8a-
302(5)(a) (Supp. 2008) ("For the purpose of determining restitution for an offense," the 
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offense only includes "criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to the sentencing court 
or to which the defendant agrees to pay restitution."). 
In other words, "restitution can include payment for crimes not listed in the 
information so long as a defendant admits responsibility or agrees to pay restitution." 
State v. Bickley, 2002 UT App 342,1J9, 60 P.3d 582 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-
201 (8)(a)). But, " a defendant cannot be ordered to pay restitution for criminal activities 
for which the defendant did not admit responsibility, was not convicted, or did not agree 
to pay restitution.'" State v. I light, 2008 UT App 118,^[3, 182 P.3d 922 (quoting 
Bickley, 2002 UT App 342 at 1|9); sec State v. Watson, 1999 U T App 273, p , 987 P.2d 
1289 (per curiam) ("A court may order restitution only if the defendant has been 
convicted of a crime that resulted in pecuniary damages and agrees to pay restitution or 
admits to the criminal conduct."). 
When assessing whether the defendant admitted responsibility, the trial court 
should not attempt to "analyze a defendant's state of mind" or "makjc] inferences." State 
v. Mast, 2001 UT App 402,1[13, 40 P.3d 1143 (quoting Watson, 1999 UT App 273 at 
*||5). Rather, it should "focus on admissions made to the sentencing court." Mast, 2001 
U [ App 402 at 1|13 (quoting Watson, 1999 UT App 273 at ]\5). "In other words, the 
statute requires that responsibility for the criminal conduct be firmly established, much 
like a guilty plea, before the court can order restitution." Mast, 2001 UT App 402 at {^13 
(quoting Watson, 1999 UT App 273 at [^5); see Hight, 2008 UT App 118 at p . 
For example, in Mast, this Court held that a defendant who pleaded guilty to 
receiving property stolen during a burglary could not be "ordered to pay restitution for all 
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items stolen in the burglary." Mast, 2001 UT App 402 at 1(1. Rather, she could only be 
ordered to pay the restitution resulting from her "admitted conduct, specifically receiving 
the stolen property enumerated in her pica." kk at ^|19. 
In that case, defendant pleaded guilty to possessing property that was stolen during 
a burglary. Id. at f||l. Although defendant was not convicted of burglary and did not 
admit responsibility for any of the other items stolen during the burglary, the trial court 
ordered her to pay restitution for the total value of property taken during the burglary less 
the recovered items. kk at }^5. On appeal, the State argued that the restitution order was 
correct because defendant acknowledged at sentencing "that her explanation of the events 
preceding her arrest was not believable.'' kk at ^fl8. This Court rejected the State's 
argument, however, noting: "Although defendant may have failed to be entirely 
forthcoming regarding her receipt of the property," the standard set by the restitution 
statute "does not allow a court to infer this as participation in the other crime." kk at *|[18 
(citation omitted). This Court then determined that defendant could not "be held to 
answer for all damages resulting from the burglary" because she "entered a guilty plea 
only to the receiving stolen property charge" and the evidence did not "firmly establish! ]" 
that she was responsible for the burglary, kk 
Likewise, in Watson, this Court held that a defendant who was charged with 
homicide, but pleaded guilty to attempted obstruction of justice, could not be ordered to 
pay restitution to the "murder victim's family." Watson, 1999 UT App 273 at \2. 
"Without making inferences as the trial court did. it cannot be said that | defendant) 
admitted responsibility for the murder nor did she agree to pay restitution." kk at €j[5. 
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In Watson, the defendant "was charged with criminal homicide and attempted 
criminal homicide because she allegedly drove codefendants . . . to and from the crime 
scene." Watson, 1999 UT App 273 at <p. She "was also charged with obstruction o[ 
justice for having sold the car used in the crime." Id, "Under a plea bargain, [defendant] 
pleaded guilty to attempted obstruction of justice." kk After "examining] and ma[king| 
inferences about (defendant's] state of mind," kL at *|[5. the trial court ordered defendant 
to pay restitution to the "murder victim's family for counseling." Ich at *]1. This Court 
reversed because "there was no firmly established admission of responsibility upon 
which to order |defendant] to pay restitution." Id at f||5. Rather, defendant "only 
admitted and pleaded guilty to the obstruction of justice charge for which there were no 
pecuniary damages." Id Thus, "it cannot be said that [defendant] admitted responsibility 
for the murder nor did she agree to pay restitution" except by "making inferences as the 
trial court did." kk~ 
Contrarily, in I light, this Court determined that where a defendant pleads guilty to 
the burglary or theft itself, it is unnecessary that "his responsibility for any particular 
missing item] | 'be firmly established . . . before the court can order restitution [for 
2
 See also Salt Lake City v. Howell, 2007 UT App 148, 2007 WL 1291084, at * 1 
(memorandum decision) (reversing order requiring defendant, who pleaded guilty to 
attempted theft by receiving stolen property, to pay restitution for "entire value of the 
stolen ramp where there was neither a conviction nor an admission to support the 
award"); Bickley, 2002 UT App 342 at *||12 (reversing order requiring defendant to pay 
restitution for child support arrearages "for dates outside the time period alleged in the 
Amended Information" because "'it cannot be said that [Defendant] admitted 
responsibility"* for those dates "'[ w|ithoul making inferences as the trial court did'"); 
State v. Galli. 967 P.2d 930, 937-38 (Utah 1998) (finding restitution order erroneous for 
conduct defendant was not convicted of and had not admitted responsibility for). 
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thcm|." Iiight, 2008 IJT App 118 at €,|4 (citation omitted). In Iiight, defendant "admitted 
to burglary/* but "he never admitted to stealing a watch, a set of keys, or a silver dollar 
collection/* id. "Thus, he argue) d] that the trial court erred in ordering him to pay 
restitution for those items/* IdL This Court disagreed, stating that "[o|nce Defendant 
pleaded guilty to burglary, the trial court acted within its broad discretion, after reviewing 
the evidence presented at the restitution hearing, in ordering restitution for any pecuniary 
damages clearly resulting from the burglary/" Id. at *||5 (citation omitted). 
As in Mast and Watson, Larscn should not "be held to answer for" the vehicle 
damage because he "entered a guilty plea only to''joyriding, not theft; the evidence did 
not "'firmly establish! ]" that he admitted responsibility for the vehicle damage; and he did 
not agree to pay restitution as part of the plea agreement. Mast, 2001 UT App 402 at *([18; 
sec Watson, 1999 UT App 273 at 1|3. 
The vehicle damage in this case was likely caused by the initial theft. It included 
removal of "the ignition switch," removal of the "sound speakers . . . from their proper 
locations," and damage to "the steering column." R. 72:3; 83-88. At the restitution 
hearing, Larscn argued that the vehicle damage was "clearly . . . caused by the break in." 
R. 122:3. flic State did not dispute this argument. R. 122:4-6. It also conceded that it 
had no evidence to prove Larscn committed the original theft. R. 122:4. Regardless, it 
argued that Larscn. by virtue of being in possession of the vehicle six days after the theft. 
was "responsible for any damage that was done to the vehicle from the time it was stolen 
until the time it was recovered/* R. 122:5. The trial court accepted this argument. R. 
122:6-7. This was an abuse of discretion because the resulting restitution order was 
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based on inference rather than on Larscn's guilty pica, firmly established evidence that 
Larsen admitted responsibility for the vehicle damage, or an agreement in the plea deal 
that Larsen would pay restitution for the vehicle damage. See Mast, 2001 UT App 402 at 
II18; Watson, 1999 UT App 273 at 1|5. 
Larsen was not charged with or convicted of the theft that caused the vehicle 
damage. He was stopped in the stolen vehicle six days after the theft occurred. R. 1-3. 
lie said that he had borrowed the car from a friend for the night and denied stealing it. R, 
72:3. Based on the evidence, the State did not charge Larsen with theft. R. 1-3. Rather, 
conceding that it did not have the evidence to prove theft, it charged Larsen with Theft by 
Receiving Stolen Property. R. 1-3; 122:4. As stated in Mast, receiving stolen property 
does not authorize the trial court to impose restitution for the damages incurred during 
original theft or burglary. See Mast, 2001 UT App 402 at ^[18; Howell, 2007 UT App 
148 at * 1 . Thereafter, Larsen pleaded guilty to Joyriding, a class A misdemeanor. In his 
guilty plea, Larsen admitted that he exercised unlawful control over the vehicle for less 
than 24 hours. Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1314(3)(a). This means that his admission did 
not put him in possession of the vehicle until more than five days after the theft was 
committed and the damage likely done. R. 2; 28; 72:3; 122:3; 130:4. 
Larsen also did not admit responsibility for the vehicle damage. In his guilty plea, 
Larsen admitted these elements: "'Unauthorized control over the motor vehicle of another 
with the intent to temporarily deprive. Possession of tools under circumstances 
manifesting an intent to use in the commission of a theft." R. 28. l ie also admitted these 
facts: "On May 6 l \ 2007 in Salt Lake County." he "exercised unlawful control over a 
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vehicle belonging to TUG Auto Brokers with the intent to temporarily deprive. At that 
time he was in possession of tools that under the circumstances manifested intent to use 
to commit a theft." R. 28; 130:4. None of these facts or elements equate to admitting 
responsibility for any damage to the vehicle. Sec Utah Code Ann. § 41-1 a-1314. If the 
State had wanted Larsen to admit responsibility for the vehicular damage, it should have 
charged him with Theft or. at the very least, Joyriding, a third degree felony, which 
rccogni/cs as an element that the vehicle was "damaged in any amount to facilitate entry 
into it or its operation." Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1314(3)(b)(iii). 
Likewise, Larsen did not admit responsibility for the vehicle damage to the 
sentencing court. In his statement for the PSR, Larsen admitted meeting a person and 
ccgoing with him to still things that wher not arcs and having the drive stolen cars for him 
and fallow him places with thes cars." R. 72:3. As in Mast, however, this statement does 
not "firmly establish! |" that Larsen committed the original theft. Mast, 2001 UT App 
402 at f||l 8. Rather, as in Watson, if it broadens Larsen\s admission at all it still requires 
impermissible "inferences" to deduce that Larsen admitted responsibility for the vehicle 
damage. Watson, 1999 UF App 273 at ^5. Further, at the sentencing hearing, Larsen did 
not speak to the trial court or make any admissions at all. R. 130:8-11. 
Therefore, because Larsen was not convicted of and did not admit responsibility 
for damaging the vehicle, the trial court could only order him to pay restitution for the 
damage if he "agreed to make restitution as part of a plea agreement." Utah Code Ann. § 
76-3-201(l)(b), (l)(c)(i). (4)(a): see Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-38a-102(2), (14)(a); 77-38a-
302( 1). At the time of the plea agreement, however, the State did not fulfill its duty to 
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"provide to the district court . . . whether or not the defendant has agreed to pay the 
restitution specified as part of the plea disposition." Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-202(l) 
(2003). Accordingly, the guilty plea affidavit contains no agreement regarding restitution 
for the damage to the vehicle. See R. 27-33. Likewise, the change of plea hearing 
contains no discussion regarding restitution. See R. 130:2-7. 
Recognizing this deficiency, the State admitted at the restitution hearing that "we 
don't have evidence that [Larsen| is actually the one who stole the vehicle.," but argued 
that the trial court "must assume that the damage that was done to the vehicle was done 
while [ Larsen | was in possession of | it |." R. 122:5. Agreeing with the State, the trial 
court ordered Larsen to pay restitution for the damage to the vehicle. R. 72:6; 122:6-7. 
This ruling constituted an abuse of discretion because it exceeded the trial court's 
authority. S^e Miller, 2007 UT App 332 at f||6. When imposing restitution, the trial court 
may not "assume" that the defendant committed criminal conduct for which he was not 
convicted and did not admit responsibility. R. 122:5-7. To the contrary, the statutory 
language says a trial court should only impose restitution for criminal conduct for which 
the defendant was not convicted and did not admit responsibility, if the defendant "agreed 
to make restitution as pari of a plea agreement." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (1 )(b), 
(l)(c)(i), (4)(a); sec Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-38a-102(2), (14)(a); 77-38a-302(l). 
Therefore, because Larsen was not convicted of theft, did not admit responsibility 
for damaging the vehicle, and did not agree to pay restitution for the vehicle damage as 
part of his plea bargain, the trial court abused its discretion by ordering Larsen to pay 
restitution for the damage to the vehicle. 
17 
Indeed, this is the conclusion that the trial court correctly reached is case no. 5122. 
R. 122:9. fn case no. 5122. similar to this case. Larsen was caught driving a vehicle that 
was reported stolen three days before and pleaded guilty to Theft by Receiving Stolen 
Property. The trial court declined to impose restitution in case no. 5 122 because, "based 
upon the charge that [Larsen | admitted to[,| there's no evidence that he did any damage, 
that he was just operating the vehicle, he knew it was stolen when he was caught." R. 
122:9. Likewise, in this case, there was "no evidence" that Larsen caused the damage. 
R. 122:9. "[II|c was just operating the vehicle." R. 122:9. The trial court reached a 
different conclusion, however, because it improperly inferred that Larsen stole the car 
because "there's no evidence that he didn't steal the car." R. 122:9; sec Mast, 2001 UT 
App 402 at 1|18; Watson, 1999 UT App 273 at 1[5. 
Accordingly, this Court should reverse because the trial court abused its discretion 
by ordering Larsen to pay restitution for the vehicle damage. This Court should then 
impose a restitution order for $282 (the amount that Larsen concedes he owed to cover 
the impounding and towing), and remand "for such further proceedings as may now be 
proper." Watson, 1999 UT App 273 at Y||5-6 (holding "there was no firmly established 
admission of responsibility upon which to order | defendant | to pay restitution" because 
defendant "pleaded guilty to the obstruction of justice charge for which there were no 
pecuniary damages," and remanding for further proceedings). 
R The Trial Court Erred By Ordering Larsen to Pay Restitution in Excess of 
the $500 Ceiling Set By His Guilty Plea to Joyriding, a Class A Misdemeanor. 
If this Court disagrees with Larsen"s argument in section A and determines that 
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the trial court was authorized to order Larscn to pay restitution for the vehicle damage, 
this Court should still reverse because the evidence does not firmly establish that Larscn 
admitted damage in excess of $500. As explained above, "ca defendant cannot be 
ordered to pay restitution for criminal activities for which the defendant did not admit 
responsibility, was not convicted, or did not agree to pay restitution/" I light, 2008 UT 
App 118 a t p (citation omitted): see Watson, 1999 UT App 273 at ^|3; supra at Part A. 
The language of the Joyriding statute states that Joyriding is a third degree felony, 
rather than a class A misdemeanor, if the 'Vehicle is damaged in an amount of $500 or 
more." Utah Code Ann. §41- la-1314(3)(b)(i). Larscn pleaded guilty to the class A 
misdemeanor, not the third degree felony. R. 25-26; 27-33; 130:2, 5-6. Therefore, his 
conviction did not authorize the trial court to impose restitution in excess of $500. Utah 
Code Ann. §41 -1 a-1314(3)(b)(i). 
Further, the State did not include in the plea deal a provision saying that Larscn 
was admitting responsibility for vehicle damage in excess of $500 despite his guilty plea 
to a class A misdemeanor. R. 27-33. Nor did it include in the plea deal a provision 
saying that Larscn agreed to pay restitution for the vehicle damage. R. 27-33. Rather, at 
the restitution hearing, the State asked the trial court to hold that restitution for the 
vehicle damage was "implicit" in the plea agreement. R. 122:5. Absent an agreement as 
part of the plea bargain, however, ordering restitution in excess of the $500 ceiling 
statutorily attached to Larson's offense was inappropriate. See Mast, 2001 UT App 402 
at 1|18: Watson, 1999 UT App 273 at f,|3. 
Thus, even if Larscn admitted responsibility for the vehicle damage by pleading 
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guilty to Joyriding, a class A misdemeanor, the trial court abused its discretion when it 
concluded that the provision defining joyriding as a third degree felony if the "vehicle is 
damaged in an amount of $500 or more/* did not "prevent" it from ordering Larsen to 
pay restitution in excess of $500. R. 122:7-8. Accordingly, this Court should remand for 
a new restitution hearing to determine how much restitution, up to the $500 ceiling set by 
LarsciVs guilty plea, is owed. Sec Mast, 2001 UT App 402 at J^l 9 (remanding for 
restitution "hearing to determine what pecuniary damages resulted from defendant's 
admitted conduct, specifically receiving the stolen property enumerated in her plea"). 
CONCLUSION 
Larsen respectfully asks this Court to reverse the restitution order, impose a 
restitution order for $282, and remand for such further proceedings as may now be 
proper. Alternatively, he asks this Court to reverse and remand for a new restitution 
icarmg. 
SUBMITTED this i _ day of December, 2008. 
LORIJ.SEPPI 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH 
STATE OP UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
BRIAN DALE LARSBN, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
OSC/RESTITUTION HEARING 
POST SENTENCING 
JUDGMENT/COMMITMENT 
Case No: 071903635 FS 
Judge: WILLIAM w. BARRETT 
Date: May IS, 2008 
PRESENT 
Clerk: nancyw 
Prosecutor; CASSELL, PATRICIA S 
"Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): MISNER, MICHAEL D 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: June 28, 1987 
Video 
Tape Count; 11:03 
CHARGES 
1. JOYRIDING W/ INTENT TO TEMP DEPRIVE OWNR (amended) - Class A 
Misdemeanor 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 07/16/2007 Guilty 
2. MANUFACTURE/POSSESS BURGLARY TOOLS - Class B Misdemeanor 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 07/16/2007 Guilty 
HEARING 
COUNT: 11:03 
defense remarks regarding legal issues if restitution applies is 
appropriate on this case for damage to vehicle and property, 
restitution should not be awarded for the charge of joyriding, 
states response: damage was done while the vehicle was in the 
possession of the defendant 
defense does stipulate to $282.00 in restitution 
c/o restitution to be paid in the amount of $3,554.50 for damage 
to the vehicle only 
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JUN-04-2008 WED 03:32 PM DISTRICT COURT FAX NO, f ^387404 P. 03 
Case No: 071903635 
Date: May 15, 2008 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT and COMMITMENT 
The defendant admits the following numbered allegations aa stated 
in the Affidavit and Order to Show Cause: 1,2,3 
The defendant's probation is revoked. 
The defendant's probation is reinstated for 36 months beginning 
November 15, 2008. 
Court will consider an early release to Odyssey House treatment 
program 
Defts probation is revoked and reinstated with the same terms and 
conditions but with the added condition that deft successfully 
complete Odyssey House aftercare program 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Defendant is to serve 180 Days 
tfor WOliE 
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Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1314 (2005) 
§ 41-la-1314. Unauthorized control for extended time 
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (3), it is a class A misdemeanor for a person to 
exercise unauthorized control over a motor vehicle that is not his own, without the consent 
of the owner or lawful custodian, and with the intent to temporarily deprive the owner or 
lawful custodian of possession of the motor vehicle. 
(2) The consent of the owner or legal custodian of a motor vehicle to its control by the actor 
is not in any case presumed or implied because of the owner's or legal custodian's consent 
on a previous occasion to the control of the motor vehicle by the same or a different person. 
(3) Violation of this section is a third degree felony if: 
(a) the person does not return the motor vehicle to the owner or lawful custodian within 
24 hours after the exercise of unlawful control; or 
(b) regardless of the mental state or conduct of the person committing the offense: 
(i) the motor vehicle is damaged in an amount of $500 or more; 
(ii) the motor vehicle is used to commit a felony; or 
(iii) the motor vehicle is damaged in any amount to facilitate entry into it or its 
operation. 
(4) It is not a defense to Subsection (3)(a) that someone other than the person, or an agent 
of the person, returned the motor vehicle within 24 hours. 
(5) A violation of this section is a lesser included offense of theft under Section 76-6-404, 
when the theft is of an operable motor vehicle under Subsection 76-6-412(l)(a)(ii). 
Laws 1992, c. 1, § 171; Laws 1997. c. 100, § 1, eff. May 5, 1997; Laws 2001, c. 48, $ L 
eff. April 30, 2001; Laws 2005, c. 71, § 24, eff. May 2, 2005. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (Supp. 2008) 
§ 76-3-201. Definitions—Sentences or combination of sentences allowed—Civil 
penalties—Hearing 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Conviction" includes a: 
(i) judgment of guilt; and 
(ii) plea of guilty. 
(b) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is convicted or any 
other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits responsibility to the sentencing 
court with or without an admission of committing the criminal conduct. 
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general damages, which a 
person could recover against the defendant in a civil action arising out of the facts or 
events constituting the defendant's criminal activities and includes the money 
equivalent of property taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses 
including earnings and medical expenses. 
(d) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary damages to a 
victim, and payment for expenses to a governmental entity for extradition or 
transportation and as further defined in Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims 
Restitution Act. 
(c)(i) "Victim" means any person who the court determines has suffered pecuniary 
damages as a result of the defendant's criminal activities. 
(ii) "Victim" docs not include any coparticipant in the defendant's criminal activities. 
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a person convicted 
of an offense to any one of the following sentences or combination of them: 
(a) to pay a fine; 
(b) to removal or disqualification from public or private office; 
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law; 
(d) to imprisonment; 
(e) on or after April 27, 1992, to life in prison without parole; or 
(0 to death. 
(3)(a) This chapter docs not deprive a court of authority conferred by law to: 
(i) forfeit property; 
(ii) dissolve a corporation; 
(iii) suspend or cancel a license; 
(iv) permit removal of a person from office; 
(v) cite for contempt; or 
(vi) impose any other civil penalty. 
(b) A civil penalty may be included in a sentence. 
(4)(a) When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in pecuniary 
damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court shall order that the 
defendant make restitution to the victims, or for conduct for which the defendant has 
agreed to make restitution as part of a plea agreement. 
(b) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court shall follow the criteria 
and procedures as provided in Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims Restitution Act. 
(5)(a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, the court shall order the 
defendant to pay restitution of governmental transportation expenses if the defendant 
was: 
(i) transported pursuant to court order from one county to another within the state at 
governmental expense to resolve pending criminal charges; 
(ii) charged with a felony or a class A, B, or C misdemeanor; and 
(iii) convicted of a crime. 
(b) The court may not order the defendant to pay restitution of governmental 
transportation expenses if any of the following apply: 
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(i) the defendant is charged with an infraction or on a subsequent failure to appear a 
warrant is issued for an infraction; or 
(ii) the defendant was not transported pursuant to a court order. 
(c)(i) Restitution of governmental transportation expenses under Subsection (5)(a)(i) 
shall be calculated according to the following schedule: 
(A) $75 for up to 100 miles a defendant is transported; 
(B) $125 for 100 up to 200 miles a defendant is transported; and 
(C) $250 for 200 miles or more a defendant is transported. 
(ii) The schedule of restitution under Subsection (5)(c)(i) applies to each defendant 
transported regardless of the number of defendants actually transported in a single 
trip. 
(d) If a defendant has been extradited to this state under Title 77, Chapter 30, 
Kxtradition, to resolve pending criminal charges and is convicted of criminal activity in 
the county to which he has been returned, the court may, in addition to any other 
sentence it may impose, order that the defendant make restitution for costs expended by 
any governmental entity for the extradition. 
(6)(a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, and unless otherwise 
ordered by the court pursuant to Subsection (6)(c), the defendant shall pay restitution to 
the county for the cost of incarceration in the county correctional facility before and after 
sentencing if: 
(i) the defendant is convicted of criminal activity that results in incarceration in the 
county correctional facility; and 
(ii)(A) the defendant is not a state prisoner housed in a county correctional facility 
through a contract with the Department of Corrections; or 
(B) the reimbursement docs not duplicate the reimbursement provided under Section 
64-13e-104 if the defendant is a state probationary inmate, as defined in Section 64-
13c-102, or a state parole inmate, as defined in Section 64-13c-102. 
(b)(i) I he costs of incarceration under Subsection (6)(a) are the amount determined by 
the county correctional facility, but may not exceed the daily inmate incarceration costs 
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and medical and transportation costs for the county correctional facility. 
(ii) The costs of incarceration under Subsection (6)(a) do not include expenses 
incurred by the county correctional facility in providing reasonable accommodation 
for an inmate qualifying as an individual with a disability as defined and covered by 
the federal Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. 12101 through 12213, 
including medical and mental health treatment for the inmate's disability. 
(c) In determining whether to order that the restitution required under this Subsection 
(6) be reduced or that the defendant be exempted from the restitution, the court shall 
consider the criteria under Subsections 77-38a-302 (5)(c)(i) through (iv) and shall enter 
the reason for its order on the record. 
(d) If on appeal the defendant is found not guilty of the criminal activity under 
Subsection (6)(a)(i) and that finding is final as defined in Section 76-1-304, the county 
shall reimburse the defendant for restitution the defendant paid for costs of 
incarceration under Subsection (6)(a). 
Laws 1973, c. 196. § 76-3-201; Laws 1979, c. 69, § l;Laws 1981, c. 59. § l;Laws 1983, 
c. 85, § 1; Laws 1983, c. 88, § 3; Laws 1984, c. 18, § 1; Laws 1986, c. 156, § 1; Laws 
1987, c. 107, § 1; Laws 1990. c. 81, § 1; Laws 1992. c. 142, § 1; Laws 1993. c. 17, g 1; 
Laws 1994, c. 13. § 19: Laws 1995, c. I l l , § L eff. May 1. 1995; Laws 1995, c. 117, 
S Leff. May 1, 1995; La\\s 1995. c. 301. g L eff. May 1, 1995; La^s 1995. c. 337. § 
l.cff.Ma) 1. 1995; Laws 1995. 1st Sp.Sess.. c. 10. $ 1, eff. April 29, 1996: Laws 
1996, c. 40. $ 1. c\T. April 29. 1996; Laws 1996. c. 79. 3 98. eff. April 29. 1996; Laws 
1296. c, 241_,_§_§_2; 3^efLAi2liI29 J 1 9 6 ; Laws 1998. c. 149. § 1. eff. Ma> 4. 1998: 
Lay^L999.__c,210, $ 15. eff. Ma> 3. 1999; Laws 2001. c. 209. $ 1. cff.~April 30, 2001: 
Laws 200Zjc. 3^_$ 4. eff. May 6. 2002: Laws 2003. c. 280. 3 1, eff. May 5. 2003; 
Laws 2006, c. 208, 3 1. eff. May L 2006; Laws 2007, c. 154, 3 1. eff. April 30. 2007: 
Laws 2007. c. 339. 3 3, ell. April 30. 2007: Laws 2007, c. 353. 3 9, eff. April 30, 2007: 
Lav, s 2008, c. 151, 3 L eff. May 5. 2008. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-205 (2003) 
76-6-205. Manufacture or possession of instrument for burglary or theft. 
Any person who manufactures or possesses any instrument, tool, device, article, or other 
thing adapted, designed, or commonly used in advancing or facilitating the commission of 
any offense under circumstances manifesting an intent to use or knowledge that some 
person intends to use the same in the commission of a burglary or theft is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (Supp. 2007) 
§ 76-6-408. Receiving stolen property—Duties of pawnbrokers 
(1) A person commits theft if he receives, retains, or disposes of the property of another knowing 
that it has been stolen, or believing that it probably has been stolen, or who conceals, sells, 
withholds or aids in concealing, selling, or withholding the property from the owner, knowing the 
property to be stolen, intending to deprive the owner of it. 
(2) The knowledge or belief required for Subsection (1) is presumed in the case of an actor who: 
(a) is found in possession or control of other property stolen on a separate occasion; 
(b) has received other stolen property within the year preceding the receiving offense charged; 
or 
(c) is a pawnbroker or person who has or operates a business dealing in or collecting used or 
secondhand merchandise or personal property, or an agent, employee, or representative of a 
pawnbroker or person who buys, receives, or obtains property and fails to require the seller or 
person delivering the property to: 
(i) certify, in writing, that he has the legal rights to sell the property; 
(ii) provide a legible print, preferably the right thumb, at the bottom of the certificate next to 
his signature; and 
(iii) provide at least one positive form of identification. 
(3) Every pawnbroker or person who has or operates a business dealing in or collecting used or 
secondhand merchandise or personal property, and every agent, employee, or representative of a 
pawnbroker or person who fails to comply with the requirements of Subsection (2)(c) is presumed 
to have bought, received, or obtained the property knowing it to have been stolen or unlawfully 
obtained. This presumption may be rebutted by proof. 
(4) When, in a prosecution under this section, it appears from the evidence that the defendant was 
a pawnbroker or a person who has or operates a business dealing in or collecting used or 
secondhand merchandise or personal property, or was an agent, employee, or representative of a 
pawnbroker or person, that the defendant bought, received, concealed, or withheld the property 
without obtaining the information required in Subsection (2)(d), then the burden shall be upon the 
defendant to show that the property bought, received, or obtained was not stolen. 
(5) Subsections (2)(c), (3), and (4) do not apply to scrap metal processors as defined in Section 
76-10-901. 
(6) As used in this section: 
(a) "Dealer" means a person in the business of buying or selling goods. 
(b) "Pawnbroker" means a person who: 
(i) loans money on deposit of personal property, or deals in the purchase, exchange, or 
possession of personal property on condition of selling the same property back again to the 
pledge or depositor; 
(ii) loans or advances money on personal property by taking chattel mortgage security on the 
property and takes or receives the personal property into his possession and who sells the 
unredeemed pledges; or 
(iii) receives personal property in exchange for money or in trade for other personal property. 
(c) "Receives" means acquiring possession, control, or title or lending on the security of the 
property. 
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-6-408; Laws 1979, c. 71, § 1; Laws 1993. c. 102. § 1: Laws 2004, c. 
299, § 16, eff. Jan. 1,2005. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-102 (Supp. 2008) 
§77-38a-102. Definitions 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Conviction" includes a: 
(a) judgment of guilt; 
(b) a plea of guilty; or 
(c) a plea of no contest. 
(2) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is convicted or any 
other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits responsibility to the sentencing 
court with or without an admission of committing the criminal conduct. 
(3) "Department" means the Department of Corrections. 
(4) "Diversion" means suspending criminal proceedings prior to conviction on the 
condition that a defendant agree to participate in a rehabilitation program, make 
restitution to the victim, or fulfill some other condition. 
(5) "Party" means the prosecutor, defendant, or department involved in a prosecution. 
(6) "Pecuniary damages" means all demonstrable economic injury, whether or not yet 
incurred, which a person could recover in a civil action arising out of the facts or events 
constituting the defendant's criminal activities and includes the fair market value of 
property taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses including lost 
earnings and medical expenses, but excludes punitive or exemplary damages and pain 
and suffering. 
(7) "Plea agreement" means an agreement entered between the prosecution and defendant 
setting forth the special terms and conditions and criminal charges upon which the 
defendant will enter a plea of guilty or no contest. 
(8) "Plea in abeyance" means an order by a court, upon motion of the prosecution and the 
defendant, accepting a plea of guilty or of no contest from the defendant but not, at that 
time, entering judgment of conviction against him nor imposing sentence upon him on 
condition that he comply with specific conditions as set forth in a plea in abeyance 
agreement. 
(9) ''Pica in abeyance agreement" means an agreement entered into between the 
prosecution and the defendant setting forth the specific terms and conditions upon which, 
following acceptance of the agreement by the court, a plea may be held in abeyance. 
(10) "Plea disposition" means an agreement entered into between the prosecution and 
defendant including diversion, plea agreement, plea in abeyance agreement, or any 
agreement by which the defendant may enter a plea in any other jurisdiction or where 
charges are dismissed without a plea. 
(11) "Restitution'' means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary damages to a 
victim, including prejudgment interest, the accrual of interest from the time of 
sentencing, insured damages, reimbursement for payment of a reward, and payment for 
expenses to a governmental entity for extradition or transportation and as may be further 
defined by law. 
(12)(a) "Reward" means a sum of money: 
(i) offered to the public for information leading to the arrest and conviction of an 
offender; and 
(ii) that has been paid to a person or persons who provide this information, except that 
the person receiving the payment may not be a codefendant, an accomplice, or a 
bounty hunter. 
(b) "Reward" does not include any amount paid in excess of the sum offered to the 
public. 
(13) "Screening" means the process used by a prosecuting attorney to terminate 
investigative action, proceed with prosecution, move to dismiss a prosecution that has 
been commenced, or cause a prosecution to be diverted. 
(14)(a) "Victim" means any person whom the court determines has suffered pecuniary 
damages as a result of the defendant's criminal activities. 
(b) "Victim" may not include a codefendant or accomplice. 
Laws 2001. c. 137. $ 3. ell. April 30. 2001; Laws 2003, c. 278. $ 2. e l l Ma> 5. 2003; 
Laws 2005. c. 96. § 3. eff May 2. 2005. 
2 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-202 (2003) 
77-38a-202. Restitution determination -Prosecution duties and responsibilities. 
(1) At the time of entry of a conviction or entry of any plea disposition of a felony or 
class A misdemeanor, the attorney general, county attorney, municipal attorney, or 
district attorney shall provide to the district court: 
(a) the names of all victims, including third parties, asserting claims for restitution; 
(b) the actual or estimated amount of restitution determined at that time; and 
(c) whether or not the defendant has agreed to pay the restitution specified as part of 
the plea disposition. 
(2) In computing actual or estimated restitution, the attorney general, county attorney, 
municipal attorney, or district attorney shall: 
(a) use the criteria set forth in Section 77-38a-302 for establishing restitution 
amounts; and 
(b) in cases involving multiple victims, incorporate into any conviction or plea 
disposition all claims for restitution arising out of the investigation for which the 
defendant is charged. 
(3) If charges arc not to be prosecuted as part of a plea disposition, restitution claims 
from victims of those crimes shall also be provided to the court. 
History: C. 1953, 77-38a-202, enacted by L. 2001, ch. 137, § 5. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302 (Supp. 2008) 
§ 77-38a-302. Restitution criteria 
(1) When a defendant is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in pecuniary 
damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court shall order that the 
defendant make restitution to victims of crime as provided in this chapter, or for conduct 
for which the defendant has agreed to make restitution as part of a plea disposition. For 
purposes of restitution, a victim has the meaning as defined in Subsection 77-3 8a-102(14) 
and in determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court shall follow the criteria 
and procedures as provided in Subsections (2) through (5). 
(2) In determining restitution, the court shall determine complete restitution and court-
ordered restitution. 
(a) "'Complete restitution" means restitution necessary to compensate a victim for all 
losses caused by the defendant. 
(b) "Court-ordered restitution" means the restitution the court having criminal 
jurisdiction orders the defendant to pay as a part of the criminal sentence at the time of 
sentencing or within one year after sentencing. 
(c) Complete restitution and court-ordered restitution shall be determined as provided in 
Subsection (5). 
(3) If the court determines that restitution is appropriate or inappropriate under this part, 
the court shall make the reasons for the decision part of the court record. 
(4) Tf the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of the restitution, 
the court shall allow the defendant a full hearing on the issue. 
(5)(a) For the purpose of determining restitution for an offense, the offense shall include 
any criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to the sentencing court or to which the 
defendant agrees to pay restitution. A victim of an offense that involves as an clement a 
scheme, a conspiracy, or a pattern of criminal activity, includes any person directly 
harmed by the defendant's criminal conduct in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or 
pattern. 
(b) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for complete restitution, the 
court shall consider all relevant facts, including: 
(i) the cost of the damage or loss if the offense resulted in damage to or loss or 
destruction of property of a victim of the offense; 
(ii) the cost of necessary medical and related professional services and devices 
relating to physical or mental health care, including nonmedical care and treatment 
rendered in accordance with a method of healing recognized by the law of the place of 
treatment; 
(iii) the cost of necessary physical and occupational therapy and rehabilitation; 
(iv) the income lost by the victim as a result of the offense if the offense resulted in 
bodily injury to a victim; 
(v) up to five days of the individual victim's determinable wages that are lost due to 
theft of or damage to tools or equipment items of a trade that were owned by the 
victim and were essential to the victim's current employment at the time of the 
offense; and 
(vi) the cost of necessary funeral and related services if the offense resulted in the 
death of a victim. 
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for court-ordered restitution, 
the court shall consider the factors listed in Subsections (5)(a) and (b) and: 
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the burden that payment of restitution 
will impose, with regard to the other obligations of the defendant; 
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment basis or on other 
conditions to be fixed by the court; 
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of restitution and the 
method of payment; and 
(iv) other circumstances which the court determines may make restitution 
inappropriate. 
(d)(i) lixcept as provided in Subsection (5)(d)(ii), the court shall determine complete 
restitution and court-ordered restitution, and shall make all restitution orders at the time 
of sentencing if feasible, otherwise within one year after sentencing. 
(ii) Any pecuniary damages that have not been determined by the court within one 
year after sentencing may be determined by the Board of Pardons and Parole. 
2 
(e) The Board of Pardons and Parole may, within one year after sentencing, refer an 
order of judgment and commitment back to the court for determination of restitution. 
Laws 2001. c. 137. 3 8. cff. April 30. 2001: Laws 2002. c. 35. 3 13. eff. Ma\ 6. 2002: 
Laws 2002. c. 185. $51, cff. May 6, 2002: Laws 2003, c. 285. 3 1, eff. May 5. 2003: 
Laws 2005. c. 96. § 5. cff. May 2, 2005. 
3 
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424 East 500 South, #300
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 r-
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH, STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT IN 
SUPPORT OF GUILTY PLEA AND 
Plaintlff
' CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL 
v. 
BRIAN LARSEN,
 C g s e NQ 0 7 1 9 0 3 6 3 5 F S 
Defendant. J u d 9 e B A R R E T T 
I, BRIAN LARSEN, hereby acknowledge and certify that I have been 
advised of and that I understand the following facts and rights: 
Notification of Charges 
I am pleading guilty (or no contest) to the following crimes: 
Crime & Statutory Provision Degree Punishment: Min/Max and/or 
Minimum Mandatory 
A. JOYRIDING MA 0-1 YEARS JAIL; $ 2,500 plus 
41-la-1314 85% fine and surcharges 
B. Possession of Burglary Tools 
76-6-205 MB 6 MONTHS JAIL; $1000 + 85% 
fine and surcharges 
I have received a copy of the (Amended) Information against me. I have read 
it, or had it read to me, and I understand the nature and the elements of crime(s) to 
which I am pleading guilty (or no contest). 
The elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest) are: 
Unauthorized control over the motor vehicle of another with the intent to temporarily 
deprive. Possession of tools under circumstances manifesting an intent to use in the 
commission of a theft. 
I understand that by pleading guilty I will be admitting that I committed the crimes 
listed above. (Or, if I am pleading no contest, I am not contesting that I committed 
the foregoing crimes). I stipulate and agree (or, if I am pleading no contest, I do not 
dispute or contest) that the following facts describe my conduct and the conduct of 
other persons for which I am criminally liable. These facts provide a basis for the 
court to accept my guilty (or no contest) pleas and prove the elements of the 
crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest): 
On May 6, 2007 in Salt Lake County. Brian Larsen exercised unauthorized control 
over the motor vehicle of THG Auto Brokers with the intent to temporarily deprive. 
He also possessed tools that under the circumstances manifested an intent to use to 
commit a theft. 
Waiver of Constitutional Rights 
I am entering these pleas voluntarily. I understand that I have the following 
rights under the constitutions of Utah and of the United States. I also understand 
that if I plead guilty (or no contest) I will give up all the following rights: 
Counsel: I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and 
that if I cannot afford one, an attorney will be appointed by the court at no cost to me. 
I understand that I might later, if the judge determined that I was able, be required to 
pay for the appointed lawyer's service to me. 
I have not waived my right to counsel 
If I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney is Michael Misner My 
attorney and I have fully discussed this statement, my rights, and the consequences 
of my guilty (or no contest) plea(s). 
Jury Trial. I know that I have a right to a speedy and public trial by an 
impartial (unbiased) jury and that I will be giving up that right by pleading guilty (or no 
contest). 
Confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses. I know that if I were to 
have a trial, a) I would have the right to see and observe the witnesses who testified 
against me and b) my attorney, or myself if I waived my right to an attorney, would 
have the opportunity to cross-examine all of the witnesses who testified against me. 
Right to compel witnesses. I know that if I were to have a trial, I could call 
witnesses if I chose to, and I would be able to obtain subpoenas requiring the 
attendance and testimony of those witnesses. If I could not afford to pay for the 
witnesses to appear, the State would pay those costs. 
Right to testify and privilege against self-incrimination. I know that if I 
were to have a trial, I would have the right to testify on my own behalf. I also know 
that if I chose not to testify, no one could make me testify or make me give evidence 
against myself. I also know that if I chose not to testify, the jury would be told that 
they could not hold my refusal to testify against me. 
Presumption of innocence and burden of proof. I know that if I do not 
plead guilty (or no contest), I am presumed innocent until the State proves that I am 
guilty of the charged crime(s). If I choose to fight the charges against me, I need 
only plead "not guilty," and my case will be set for a trial. At a trial, the State would 
have the burden of proving each element of the charge(s) beyond a reasonable 
doubt. If the trial is before a jury, the verdict must be unanimous, meaning that each 
juror would have to find me guilty. 
I understand that if I plead guilty (or no contest), I give up the presumption of 
innocence and will be admitting that I committed the crime(s) stated above. 
Appeal. I know that under the Utah Constitution, if I were convicted by a jury 
or judge, I would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence. If I could not 
afford the costs of an appeal, the State would pay those costs for me. I understand 
that I am giving up my right to appeal my conviction if I plead guilty (or no contest). I 
understand that if I wish to appeal my sentence I must file a notice of appeal within 
30 days after my sentence is entered. 
I know and understand that by pleading guilty, I am waiving and giving up all 
the statutory and constitutional rights as explained above. 
Consequences of Entering a Guilty (or No Contest) Plea 
Potential penalties. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for 
each crime to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest). I know that by pleading 
guilty (or no contest) to a crime that carries a mandatory penalty, I will be subjecting 
myself to serving a mandatory penalty for that crime. I know my sentence may 
include a prison term, fine, or both. 
I know that in addition to a fine, an eighty-five percent (85%) surcharge will be 
imposed. I also know that I may be ordered to make restitution to any victim(s) of my 
crimes, including any restitution that may be owed on charges that are dismissed as 
part of a plea agreement. 
Consecutive/concurrent prison terms. I know that if there is more than one 
crime involved, the sentences may be imposed one after another (consecutively), or 
they may run at the same time (concurrently). I know that I may be charged an 
additional fine for each crime that I plead to. I also know that if I am on probation or 
parole, or awaiting sentencing on another offense of which I have been convicted or 
which I have plead guilty (or no contest), my guilty (or no contest) plea(s) now may 
result in consecutive sentences being imposed on me. If the offense to which I am 
now pleading guilty occurred when I was imprisoned or on parole, I know the law 
requires the court to impose consecutive sentences unless the court finds and states 
on the record that consecutive sentences would be inappropriate. 
Plea agreement. My guilty (or no contest) plea(s) (is/are) (is/are not) the 
result of a plea agreement between myself and the prosecuting attorney. All the 
promises, duties, and provisions of the plea agreement, if any, are fully contained in 
this statement, including those explained below: 
Count 1 is amended to a MA joyriding and with a plea to that charge and to 
count 2, count 3 is dismissed. 
Trial judge not bound. I know that any charge or sentencing concession or 
recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the 
charges for sentencing, made or sought by either defense counsel or the 
prosecuting attorney are not binding on the judge. I also know that any opinions they 
express to me as to what they believe the judge may do are not binding on the 
judge. 
Defendant's Certification of Voluntariness 
I am entering this plea of my own free will and choice. No force, threats, of 
unlawful influence of any kind have been made to get me to plead guilty (or no 
contest). No promises except those contained in this statement have been made to 
me. 
I have read this statement, or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and I 
understand its contents and adopt each statement in it as my own. I know that I am 
free to change or delete anything contained in this statement, but I do not wish to 
make any changes because all of the statements are correct. 
I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney. 
I a m iOyears of age. I have attended school through the / / grade. I 
can read and understand the English language. If I do not understand English, an 
interpreter has been provided to me. 1 was not under the influence of any drugs, 
medication, or intoxicants which would impair my judgment when I decided to plead 
guilty. I am not presently under the influence of any drug, medication, or intoxicants 
which impair my judgment. 
I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind and to be mentally 
capable of understanding these proceedings and the consequences of my plea. I 
am free of any mental disease, defect, or impairment that would prevent me from 
understanding what I am doing or from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily 
entering my plea. 
I understand that if I want to withdraw my guilty (or no contest) plea(s), I must 
file a written motion to withdraw my plea(s) before sentence is announced. I 
understand that for a plea held in abeyance, a motion to withdraw from the plea 
agreement must be made within 30 days of pleading guilty or no contest. I will only 
be allowed to withdraw my plea if I show that it was not knowingly and voluntarily 
made. I understand that any challenge to my plea(s) made after sentencing must be 
pursued under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act in Title 78, Chapter 35a, and Rule 
65C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Dated this 16 day of July , 2007 . 
"Cma/ru Tnt/Asm, 
DEFENDANT 
Certificate of Defense Attorney 
certify that I am the attorney for Brian Larsen , the defendant 
above, and that I know he/she has read the statement or that I have read it to 
him/her; I have discussed it with him/her and believe that he/she fully understands 
the meaning of its contents and is mentally and physically competent. To the best of 
my knowledge and belief, after an appropriate investigation, the elements of the 
crime(s) and the factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal conduct are correctly 
stated; and these, along with the other representations and declarations made byjthe 
defendant in the foregoing affidavit, are accurate and true 
ATTORNEVFOFTfJI 
Bar No. 8742 
Certificate of Prosecuting Attorney 
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against 
Brian Larsen , defendant. I have reviewed this Statement of 
Defendant and find that the factual basis of the defendant's criminal conduct which 
constitutes the offense(s) is true and correct. No improper inducements, threats, or 
coercion to encourage a plea has been offered defendant. The plea negotiations are 
fully contained in the Statement and in the attached Plea Agreement or as 
supplemented on the record before the Court. There is reasonable cause to believe 
that the evidence would support the conviction of defendant for the offense(s) for 
which the plea(s) is/are entered and that the acceptance of the plea(s) would serve 
the public interest. 
PROSECUTING ATTORNI 
Bar No. ^ s ^ q -
Order 
Based on the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement and the certification of 
the defendant and counsel, and based on any oral representations in court, the 
Court witnesses the signatures and finds that defendant's guilty (or no contest) 
plea(s) is/are freely, knowingly, and voluntarily made. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the-defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) to 
the crime(s) set forth in the Statemen/tbe aqcepjted and entered. 
Dated this A day of 
DISTRICT COURT JUDG^E 
?P> 
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SALT LAKE, UTAH - JULY 16, 2 007 
HONORABLE WILLIAM W. BARRETT PRESIDING 
For the Plaintiff: CHRISTINA P. ORTEGA 
For the Defendant: MICHAEL D. MISNER 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
MR. MISNER: Judge, the matter of Brian Larsen. 
Judge, what we anticipate on Mr. Larsen is that Count I would 
be amended to Joyriding, it's a Class A Misdemeanor. The 
statute is 41.1(a) 13.14. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. MISNER: And he'll plead to that and to Count 
II. 
THE COURT: The burglary tools? 
MR. MISNER: Yes. 
THE COURT: And then the red light would be 
dismissed? 
MR. MISNER: Yeah, sure. 
THE COURT: You've explained to Mr. Larsen his 
constitutional rights? 
MR. MISNER: I have. 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
THE COURT: And you're satisfied that the plea will 
be voluntarily, knowingly and with understanding? 
MR. MISNER: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Larsen, are you satisfied with the 
advise given you by Mr. Misner? 
1 
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influence 
you? 
asthma. 
THE 
THE 
THE 
THE 
DEFENDANT: 
COURT: How 
DEFENDANT: 
Yes, 
lone 
Your Honor. 
[ have you been in jail, sir? 
Approximately a month and a half. 
COURT: Month and a half. You're not under the 
of any unlawful drugs or alcohol at this time are 
THE 
THE 
The 
THE 
DEFENDANT: 
COURT: Are 
Defendant: 
No, 
you 
Just 
Your Honor. 
taking any kind of medication? 
, Albuterol inhaler for 
COURT: So you're thinking clearly and 
understand what you're about 
right to 
THE 
THE 
DEFENDANT: 
COURT: And 
Yes, 
you 
plead not guilty if 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
to do; is that right? 
Your Honor. 
do understand that you 
you chose? 
my 
you 
have a 
THE COURT: Now, Mr. Misner was talking about your 
constitutional rights. I'm going to go over those again. I 
need to be satisfied that you understand these rights and 
understand that by entering a plea to the two charges he has 
identified, that you are giving these rights up. They are 
the right to a speedy trial; the right to an impartial jury. 
The right to confront and cross-examine witnesses produced by 
the State and provide a defense; the right against self-
incrimination; the right to compel witnesses on your own 
behalf at no cost to you, right to proof of guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt and if convicted, the right to appeal a 
conviction. 
You also have the presumption of innocence until 
you admit your guilt. Once you admit your guilt, that 
presumption goes away. Do you have any questions about these 
rights, sir? 
THE DEFENDANT: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Do you understand each of these rights? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: And you understand that you're giving 
them up when you enter your pleas? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: Mr. Misner, would you give me a factual 
basis for the entry of the plea, please? 
MR. MISNER: Judge, it was on May 6th, 2007 in Salt 
Lake County, Mr. Larsen exercised unlawful control over a 
vehicle belonging to THG Auto Brokers with the intent to 
temporarily deprive. At that time he was in possession of 
tools that under the circumstances manifested intent to use 
to commit a theft. 
THE COURT: And are those facts true, Mr. Larsen? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: You understand, sir, you're pleading to 
a Class A Misdemeanor and a B, you can be sentenced up to a 
4 
1 year on the A, 180 days on the B? The respective fines on an 
2 A is $2500 plus an 85 percent surcharge. On a B it's $1000 
3 plus an 85 percent surcharge. Do you understand that, sir? 
4 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
5 THE COURT: How do you plead to a Joyride, a Class A 
6 Misdemeanor and Possession of Burglary Tools, a Class B 
7 Misdemeanor, guilty or not? 
8 THE DEFENDANT: Guilty. 
9 THE COURT: Okay. Will you have him sign the 
10 statement, please? 
11 THE BAILIFF: Are you right handed? 
12 THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. 
13 MR. MISNER: And Judge, we would ask the Court to 
14 consider a release to pre-trial pending sentencing. Now that 
15 he's entered pleas to a couple of misdemeanors, he does have 
16 a job available. He lives with his girlfriend and her 
17 children, would like to get out and work and help her with 
18 them. I believe his family is here in court like they were 
19 last time. Seems to have good support. 
20 THE COURT: I don't know who gave me this 
21 psychological assessment, that-
22 MR. MISNER: [Unintelligible]. 
23 THE COURT: Did you give that to me? Okay, what I'm 
24 going to do is refer him to AP&P for a pre-sentence report 
25 and - has he signed that? Do you want to bring that up to 
1 me, Mr. Misner. 
2 THE BAILIFF: Will you do that for me. Thank you. 
3 MR. MISNER: Thank you. 
4 THE COURT: If you'll prepare an order I'll release 
5 him to pre-trial. Make sure he understands what he needs to 
6 do. 
7 Based upon the representations of Mr. Misner and 
8 the statements made to me by Mr. Larsen, I'm going to find 
9 that he, and from my personal observations of him, I'm going 
10 to find he did voluntarily and knowingly executed this 
11 statement and I'm going to approve it at this time, and 
12 incorporating the statement by reference of his plea as a 
13 conviction. Released to pre-trial. Maybe he ought to be 
14 checking in daily or every couple of days. He'll waive the 
15 maximum time? 
16 MR. MISNER: He will. 
17 THE COURT: How about September 10, 9:00? 
18 MR. MISNER: Permission to approach? 
19 THE COURT: Any other conditions, obviously. 
20 MR. MISNER: I've talked with him about the fact 
21 that there are two different people that he has to meet with 
22 as soon as he's out, one named AP&P and one named pre-trial, 
23 that they are two different entities. 
24 THE COURT: And don't foul up, all right? 
25 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
1 THE COURT: Make sure you get out to AP&P. Make sure 
2 you check in with pre-trial. 
3 MR. MISNER: Thank you, Your Honor. That's all I 
4 have. 
5 I (Whereupon the hearing was concluded) 
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4 For the Defendant: CATHERINE E. LILLY 
5 P R O C E E D I N G S 
6 MS. LILLY: Thank you, Your Honor. Brian Larsen. 
7 I'm standing in for Michael Misner. 
8 THE COURT: Larsen, all right. I have two cases it 
9 looks like. 
10 MS. LILLY: Yes. Looks like he entered guilty pleas 
11 to a Class A and a Class B. 
12 THE COURT: Case number 3635 is an A and a B. And 
13 then the other case is a 3rd? 
14 MS. LILLY: Oh, it's a 3rd, okay. 
15 THE COURT: Yes. 
16 MS. LILLY: I only have a pre-sentence report. 
17 THE COURT: I have an addendum on the 3rd. Did you 
18 get an opportunity to look at that? 
19 MS. LILLY: No, what does it - may I look at it? 
20 MR. SHUMAN: Okay, let's see, here it is. 
21 THE COURT: They say 90 days jail, fine, fee, DORA 
22 substance abuse eval. 
23 MS. LILLY: So it's essentially the same except for 
24 the 90 days? 
25 THE COURT: Now this one says 60 days, fine, fee, 
restitution-
MS. LILLY: And no contact-
THE COURT: No contact. I don't know, what do you 
want - do you want to take a look at this amendment 
(inaudible)? 
MS. LILLY: Well, it sounds like it's about the same 
in terms. And Your Honor, he has spent 90 days in jail. We 
are asking the Court to let that count for the time that he 
needs to do and then refer him to AP&P. 
THE COURT: So he did 90 days? 
MS. LILLY: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
THE COURT: No sense in giving him more time then. 
MS. LILLY: Right. 
THE COURT: Let's sentence him on the felony first, 
5122. I'm going to sentence him to an indeterminate term at 
the Utah State Prison, 0-5, stay the imposition of that 
sentence. Place him on 36 month probation with Adult 
Probation and Parole. I'm going to fine him $250 and assess a 
$250 public recoupment fee for services of Ms. Lilly. AP&P 
can determine how that should be paid. I also want him to 
perform 25 hours of community service within the next six 
months, complete a DORA substance abuse evaluation and any 
recommended treatment, complete a mental health evaluation 
and any recommended treatment. 
I don't know if there's any restitution on this 
9 
1 theft charge so I'll leave that open. No alcohol, no drugs. 
2 He will be required to submit his person, place of residence 
3 or any property under his control to search and the detection 
4 of drugs, no alcohol and submit to drug testing at the 
5 request of his probation officer. He's also to obtain a 
6 mental health evaluation and engage in any recommended 
7 treatment. 
8 Case number 3635, 180 days and a year on the A and 
9 B. Consecutive, suspended, 36 months probation with Adult 
10 Probation and Parole. Is there any question about the 
11 restitution? 
12 MS. LILLY: Your Honor, I don't know. You know, 
13 like I said, this is Mr. Misner's case. I'd only ask that 
14 give them 45 days for the parties to work it out. 
15 THE COURT: All right. They do have a number here so 
16 I'll leave the restitution on this case open for 45 days and 
17 let the State submit to Mr. Misner whatever is required. 
18 Okay? 
19 MS. LILLY: Thank you. 
20 THE DEFENDANT: Thank you, Your Honor. 
21 MR. SHUMAN: Your Honor, one question. Are these 
22 cases running consecutive or concurrent? 
23 THE COURT: Consecutive. 
24 MR. SHUMAN: Okay, good. 
25 THE COURT: The A and the B are concurrent but 
10 
consecutive to the 3rd. Did I get that right, consecutive to 
the other case, the Third Degree Felony. Okay? 
MS. LILLY: Are we done? 
THE COURT: We're done. 
MS. LILLY: Okay, thank you. 
COURT CLERK: We have a question (inaudible). On 
the fine and attorney, was there a fine and attorney fee? 
THE COURT: Yeah, $250, $250. 
COURT CLERK: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
(Whereupon the hearing was concluded) 
11 
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SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; MAY 15, 2008 
HONORABLE WILLIAM W. BARRETT, JUDGE PRESIDING 
For the Plaintiff: PATRICIA S. CASSELL 
For the Defendant: MICHAEL D. MISNER 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: All right, so this is State of Utah vs. 
Brian Dale Larsen, case number 071903635, and I've got two 
cases it looks like, 071905122. Do you want to go ahead and 
enter your appearances please? 
MS. CASSELL: Patricia Cassell for the State. 
MR. MISNER: Michael Misner for Mr. Larsen. 
THE COURT: Okay. Ms. Cassell. 
MS. CASSELL: I believe this might - I don't know 
that we'll be putting on evidence. 
THE COURT: What are we going to do then? 
MS. CASSELL: Unless -
MR. MISNER: Judge, I think on each of the 
restitution hearings there are legal issues to determine if 
restitution is appropriate at all. So I think we need to 
address those arguments first. If the Court were to find 
j that 
evide 
5122, 
rest 
nee 
the 
itution that' s appropriat 
on what restitution is. 
THE COURT: 
MR. MISNER: 
request for 
All right. 
Judge, I'll 
restitution 
e, 
Go 
then we 
ahead. 
start. On 
is indicati 
nee id maybe some 
case 
ng th 
ending 
at 
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1 basically the vehicle was worth $5,100. 
2 THE COURT: $4,100. 
3 MR. MISNER: I think it's $5,100 and it was sold 
4 for $1,000, so the difference is $4,100. The damage that it 
5 talks about is from the break in basically damage to the 
6 whole steering column, damage to radios and things like that, 
7 but Mr. Larsen was charged with theft by receiving a stolen 
8 vehicle not theft of a vehicle and not burglary. The legal 
9 argument we're making is that you're only entitled to 
10 restitution, even in cases where restitution is a negotiated 
11 part of the settlement that when there's a plea down to the 
12 actual restitution as a direct result of the crime committed 
13 and that's right out of the statute. Theft by receiving for 
14 you to get restitution for damage to the vehicle you have to 
15 show the vehicle was in the same condition when this person 
16 received the stolen vehicle, not the shape it was in when it 
17 was stolen, three, four, five, six, seven days before. Now 
18 in a case where the person who was charged with theft by 
19 receiving and actually crashed the vehicle, I think that's 
20 appropriate the restitution with damage to vehicle be 
21 ordered. In a case where you're just caught with the 
22 vehicle, damage that goes back to the theft of the vehicle is 
23 not appropriate. And I think if it were you'd be given the 
24 State both ways, you'd give them the opportunity to charge 
25 for the crime that's easier to prove, theft by receiving, and 
1 then you give them restitution for the crime they chose not 
2 to charge which is theft, the harder to charge crime, I'm 
3 thinking the theft by receiving case the damage has to be for 
4 damage caused by the defendant once he received the vehicle. 
5 So if we had some testimony that he had it on this day and it 
6 was fine and then he had it on this day and it wasn't, that 
7 would be appropriate. 
8 In a case where clearly damage is caused by the 
9 break in, unless he's charged with stealing the vehicle it's 
10 not appropriate. And anything else above the [inaudible] I 
11 guess we could hold on to until later. 
12 On the second case, it's a similar argument and I 
13 won't repeat it or that portion of it, but it's slightly 
14 different in that in that case the plea was to joy reading, a 
15 Class A misdemeanor, as opposed to attempted theft by 
16 receiving. In this case again, it's talking about damage, I 
17 think to the vehicle, damage to the property where the 
18 vehicle was stolen, and things like that. In this case I 
19 don't believe there was any agreement as to restitution. So 
20 I think that restitution is only appropriate for the charge 
21 that he was convicted of which is joy riding. Joy riding, a 
22 Class A misdemeanor, specifically has in its statute that 
23 there was no damage over $500. If there was damage done over 
24 $500, you cannot plead guilty to [inaudible] as a Class A 
25 misdemeanor. That becomes a third degree felony. So that 
1 would limit restitution right there to $500. Then you fall 
2 back on that same argument I just made which I won't repeat 
3 and it's just not appropriate for a theft by receiving case. 
4 In addition in that case, there's a request for 
5 restitution and damage to the gate and surrounding area where 
6 the vehicle was stolen from and an indication that this is 
7 the third time that there's been a break in there and the 
8 damage has been done to this same gate. That would be 
9 appropriate for a charge of burglary of a building or theft 
10 of a car from a building or criminal mischief. But again, 
11 there's no evidence that he anywhere near that building ever 
12 in his life. No charge in that, and so any damage to the 
13 vehicle where the vehicle was stolen from when we're talking 
14 about a vehicle that was found in his possession a week later 
15 just isn't appropriate for the charge of theft of receiving 
16 stolen property and certainly not for the conviction of joy 
17 riding. Those are the legal arguments. 
18 MS. CASSELL: And, Your Honor, I think that I'll 
19 start with the joy riding case, of course I think that we 
20 would concede that if there's any damage to a fence that was 
21 made on a breaking in and stealing of the vehicle when the 
22 vehicle was stolen wouldn't be appropriate for this defendant 
23 because there is no evidence that he - you know, we just 
24 can't - we don't have evidence that he is actually the one 
25 who stole the vehicle. 
1 However, Your Honor, any damage that had been done 
2 to the vehicle while - I think the Court must assume that the 
3 damage that was done to the vehicle was done while the 
4 defendant was in possession of that vehicle. He was in 
5 possession of the vehicle when he was arrested. I think the 
6 assumption is and should be that he was in possession of the 
7 vehicle the entire time. There's no evidence that there's 
8 anyone else in possession of the vehicle. The only evidence 
9 is that he was the one in possession of this vehicle. And as 
10 such then I think he is responsible for any damage that was 
11 done to the vehicle from the time it was stolen until the 
12 time it was recovered. And so I think then it is appropriate 
13 that he - I mean we can argue about the amounts. 
14 THE COURT: How about the argument relating to the 
15 500 bucks? 
16 MS. CASSELL: Well, Your Honor, I guess I would be 
1 7 - 1 would be - I think it's something Mr. Misner and I have 
18 to discuss, but I'm not sure that it's correct and there 
19 would be no - there was no agreement about restitution. I 
20 think that any time that there is a plea down on anything 
21 it's implicit that restitution is going to be part of that 
22 plea. And I think that - we would have to have a discussion 
23 about that, but I think that all - I think it's clear that 
24 any time that there is a plea to either joy riding or to 
25 possession of stolen property, restitution is part of that 
1 agreement. We can discuss-
2 J THE COURT: And so with respect to the car, what 
3 were the damages? 
4 MS. CASSELL: The damages to let's, start with 
5 3635, Your Honor, we would ask the damages of $3,554.50. 
6 That does not include the damage to the fence. 
7 THE COURT: Okay. Run that by me again. Three 
8 thousand? 
9 MS. CASSELL: $3,554.50. And that includes what 
10 we've included, the towing, the repairs to the - and labor 
11 and parts and detail. The other case would just be the 
12 damage to the vehicle and that's $4,100. 
13 THE COURT: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
14 MS. CASSELL: We would submit it on that, Your 
15 Honor. 
16 MR. MISNER: Your Honor -
17 THE COURT: I'm satisfied on 3635 on the joy ride 
18 that the restitution is appropriate for the damage to the 
19 car. 
20 MR. MISNER: Judge, I can say that I do have the 
21 I State's original email offer to me which doesn't mention 
22 restitution we waived at the first roll call based on the 
23 email offer. 
24 THE COURT: Well, in any event, I'm ordering 
25 restitution in this case. The other one I don't think 
1 there's a limitation. In fact, what it says is it says 
2 ''Violation of this section is a third degree felony if (a)" 
3 you got that, "(b) regardless of the mental state or conduct 
4 of the person committing the offense to the motor vehicle is 
5 damaged in the amount of $500 or more." I've got $3,554.50 
6 he's going to pay it. 
7 MR. MISNER: So that - but that would -
8 THE COURT: There's no limitation, it's just matter 
9 of the damage to the vehicle. 
10 MR. MISNER: Well, it's a Class A misdemeanor if 
11 there was no damage of $500 or more. 
12 THE COURT: Well, there was though. 
13 MR. MISNER: So that makes it a felony. That means 
14 that -
15 THE COURT: It makes it a third degree felony, 
16 that's right. 
17 MR. MISNER: We plead to an A. 
18 THE COURT: I don't care. He was charged with a 
19 third, he engaged in a joy ride, that isn't limitation. You 
20 can't tell me that when there's a plea bargain on a joy ride 
21 that I can't order restitution because of that provision. 
22 That provision doesn't prevent that. It doesn't say anything 
23 about restitution. It just says it's a third degree felony 
24 if you've got $500 in damage. 
25 MR. MISNER: Well, I would also -
1 THE COURT: And there was a plea bargain here. 
2 MR. MISNER: It's 24 hours as well and the vehicle 
3 was stolen a week earlier. 
4 THE COURT: I'm just saying you got the benefit of 
5 a plea bargain and I'm going to order. You can take it up if 
6 you want, I don't care. I think that I'm in my rights to do 
7 that that but I can be told otherwise. 
8 Now, 5122. This was a little more difficult. 
9 MR. MISNER: Judge, can I, just for the record on 
10 that one, I want to make sure that it's clear as we put in 
11 our motion that we did stipulate to the $282 on that one you 
12 just ordered which was part of that figure -
13 THE COURT: Which case are you referring to now? 
14 MR. MISNER: The one we just did. 
15 THE COURT: The joy ride? 
16 MR. MISNER: Yeah. Just, if this does get appealed 
17 I want there to be no confusion we stipulated to the $282 
18 amount. 
19 THE COURT: Okay. 
20 MR. MISNER: Sorry. 
21 THE COURT: That's okay. I agree with you, Mr. 
22 Misner, on this other case. I don't think I can order 
23 restitution. So I'm going to decline that. Obviously, these 
24 J people will have an opportunity to sue him civilly if they 
25 I chose to. 
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1 Okay. Is there anything else we need to discuss? 
2 MS. CASSELL: Yeah, what's the reason for that just 
3 so that -
4 THE COURT: I disagree that based upon the charge 
5 that he admitted to there's no evidence that he did any 
6 damage, that he was just operating the vehicle, he knew it 
7 was stolen when he was caught, I guess basically. 
8 MR. MISNER: I think the State has the same 
9 confusion I have, judge. How do we get restitution on the 
10 first case then? 
11 THE COURT: Well, I think the joy ride there's no 
12 evidence that he didn't steal the car. It's not a theft by 
13 receiving. He admitted he was in possession of it. 
14 MR. MISNER: He was charged with theft by receiving 
15 stolen property on that case as well. 
16 THE COURT: He pled to a joy ride, so I view that 
17 differently. Okay. Am I clear enough or not? Ms. Cassell? 
18 MS. CASSELL: Well, you made it clear, I'm just not 
19 sure I agree with you on that reasoning. I just don't see 
20 that, I mean, I guess I don't see the difference. I think 
21 that -
22 THE COURT: Well, I do in that sense. I feel more 
23 comfortable with the joy ride than I do by the theft by 
24 receiving so I'll deny it. They can sue him civilly. Okay? 
25 All right. 
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August 30, 2007 
To Whom it may Concern, 
I just want the court to know my feelings and frustrations about this case and the defendant. I have 
had three separate vehicles stolen from our dealership between March and June of 2007, all of which were 
damaged in a similar matter. The gate was locked, but was forced open using a chain or something similar 
which left the gate and fence damaged. In addition to the damage to the Jeep and the fence, we invested 
$5000.00 in some security/surveillance equipment, just for a sense of security. 
Attached you'll be able to see the damage that was done to the 98 Jeep, as well as prices/estimates to repair 
and get the vehicle and the property damage back to there original condition. 
ITEMIZATION OF DAMAGE TO JEEP 
Impound/Towing $282.00 
Mechanical Repairs/Labor $1412.50 
Parts (Hinkley Dodge) $1765.00 
Detail $95.00 
TOTAL $3554.50 
ITEMIZATION OF PROPERTY DAMAGE 
Fence/Gate $1200.00 
TOTAL $1200.00 
GRAND TOTAL $4754.50 
Thank you for your help in this matter. 
Sincerely, 
M 
"Oldest Dodge Dealership 
In the country" 
HINCKLEY DODGE. INC. 
2309 SOUTH STATE STREET 
Salt Lake City, UT 84115-2725 
PARTS DIRECT: (801)487-3625 
UTAH WATS: 1(800) 662-4305 
OUTSIDE UTAH WATS: 1(800)453-4721 
NATIONAL WATS: 1(800) US-MOPAR 
FAX: (801)484-6840 
IEEEE 
CHRYSLER 
GENUINE PAR \ 
| SOLD TO 
T H G AUTOBROKER 
1 3 1 8 SO 2 0 0 WEST 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 
8 0 1 - 4 8 7 - 1 3 9 1 
8 4 1 1 5 - 0 0 0 0 
SHIPPED TO 
TERMS: Parts relume i for credit musl be accompanied by invoice and subject to 20% restocking charge. 
DICSLAIMER OF WARRANTIES: All warranties on the products sold heroby are those made by the manufacturer. The seller, HINCKLEY Dodge, Inc., hereby expressley disclaims! all warranlies, either 
expressed or implied, including any implied warranty of merchantability or fitnsss for e particular purpose, and HINCKLEY Dodge, Inc., neither assumes nor authorizes any other person to agjsume for It any liability 
in connection with the sale. A Service Charge of 1-1/2% per month (A.P.R. -18%) will be made on all accounts 30 days past due. Title to the properly herein described, and any additions or substitutions, shall 
remain in the seller's name until paid in full and the purhcaser agrees to pa/ all expenses, charges, and costs, including collection costs and a reasonable attorney's fee, in the event it becomes necessary for 
seller to place this account for collection. Net, 10 days end of month. 
| YOUR PURCHASE ORDER 
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| DESCRIPTION 
5 0 1 7 5 0 8 A A : LINK: LIFTGA.TE HANDLE 
5 0 7 2 3 3 7AA. : HANDLE: LIFTGATE 
4 8 6 4 3 5 4 A B : COLUMN: STEERING 
470.4383AH : RADIO: AM/FM WITH CD 
5 6 0 3 8 5 4 8 A A : SPEAKER: DOOR 
56 0 0 7 3 4 9 : SPEAKER: DOOR 
5EY58LAZAB : CARPET: CARGO FLOOR 
: DATE PRINTED | 8 / 2 9 / 0 7 | TIME | 1 4 : 2 8 : 2 1 
PARTS DEPARTMENT HOURS 
8 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. M - F 
Thank You! 
NO RETURN ON ELECTRICAL OR SAFETY ITEMS OR SPECIAL ORDERS. 
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GC iTILL NEEDS / THINGS T O W A T C H FOR: 
Case No. Q~? ~f f i A J ^ 
IMPOUND RELEASE 
Salt Lake City Pol ice Department 
The Impound Lot is located at 2150 West 500 South (Take 400 South westbound to 2150 West north side of street) 
Fees 
TowingFee:'$. '&(£)b/' ' ^ • 
^ 
Storage Fee: $• O / 0V fT\ / \ 
.'67 
TOTAL: $" ftg^ftO.* 
The storage fee includes the day the vehicle is impouEgjA \T\ 
the day it is released, weekends and holidays. F T * 
NO CHECKS ACCEPTED 
MAY i > 
VEHICLE INFORMATION 
Make:' \ W^^ 
=3 — - M : : 
Year: 6f1) • License No: State: _ (A i 
RELEASE INFORMATION 
Release to: 
Address: _ J H 
Drivers Lie No: 
Representing: __ •-r#& 
Released by: 
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PECK UP FROM IMPOUND LOT 
PLEASE READ CAREFULLYI MUST HA WE A VAUD DRiV&VS LICENSE ON PERS0M 
Upon receipt of this "Release Form" and "Paid Receipt", the vehicle listed above MUST BE REMOVED from 
the Impound Lot, 2150 West 500 South, prior to 6:00 P.M., this date: K;^" j j~(j / Failure to do so will 
require you to return to the Police Department/Service Desk, Lobby-Main Floor, to obtain an additional "Paid 
Receipt" for extra storage fee(s). Both receipt and this form must be presented at the Impound Lot. The vehicle 
will be released at the Impound Lot to a licensed driver only. 
Signature of p_erso 
Released to Date J 5 " - V / - < 3 * 7 
•Servdesk Form la2006 
